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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Ronald Lee Macik petitions the Idaho Supreme Court for review of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals decision issued on January 23, 2015 in the above entitled case. 
Dismissing his post-conviction petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. maci k disputes the factual findings of the Appeals Court as he al so 
disputed the factual findings of the trial court, and in all related cases 
assigned to the petitioner. In particlular Mr. Macik disputes the written opinion 
of the Court of Appeals, as he never admitted to possessiong the weapon or killing 
the deceased at any time. 
Mr. Macik has and does assert an Actual/Factual Innocence claim. he also has 
and does state a federal claim pursuant to the 5th; 6th; and 14th Amendments to 
the United States Constitutiuon. 
This is a fourtythree year old murder case and conviction. Macik was sentenced 
without a trial after pleading guilty to First Degree Murder and was sentenced to 
life in prison, on September 14, 1972. 
On August 10th, 1071 Ronald Lee Macik was incarcerated at the old idaho State 
Pen along with co-defendants Danny R. Powers and William L. Burt, and the deceased 
so called murder victim William henry Butler. macik was doing time on a 1969 
robbery conviction. The conditions within the prison were deplorable, and the 
guards were untrained and treatment and care of prisoner's would amount to cruel 
and unusual punishment using any standard. On August 10, 1971 the prisoner's 
rioted. it was 112 degrees inside the cellblocks that day. 
Early in the riot Macik had to stab another prisoner, Charles Rice to protect 
himself. Macik was charged with Attempted murder for this on August 23, 1971. 
Those charges were dismissed September 29, 1972. 
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The prisoner's were not 
segregated or separated from other violent predators. William henry Butler was a 
documentedSodomite. An institutional predator of the worse degree. Both prior to 
and during the riot, 'Bi 11 Butler' preyed upon numerous other prisoner's. The 
boiling point for those other prisoner's was, when during the riot, the than Ada 
Cou8nty prosecutor, James E. Risch, Esq.; Ada County Sheriff, Paul W. Bright; and 
Warden Randall mays, went to the prison and made the Sodomite Bill Butler, their 
'Inmate Representative' to discuss issues surrounding the riot and conditions 
within the prison. 
The official's approval of Bill Butler, and promotion to spokesman, only 
emboldened his behavior and created more fear and hopelessness, altogether, misery 
within the broiling prison. As anyone can understand! 
When the Petitioner, Ronald Lee Macik was accosted by the Sodomite on August 
14, 1971, Macik went with William h:: ()' But12r to the gymsasium Boxing Ring area, 
where there was a shower area 'Bill Butler' often used in his effectuations toward 
sodomizing the prison populace. There waiting for the Sodomite was a number of 
prisoner's. Some, friends of others whom had been sodomized by Bill Butler, Danny 
R. Powers, to name one, being a friend of one. 
As the record indicates and the petitioner will point out below, the boxing 
arena and shower area could be closed off, with one door locked with a padlock, 
and the other, with a window and curtain, could be locked from the inside. This 
was the case that eaveni ng when an officer was alerted by another officer that 
something was going down in the boxing arena area. This officer is Allen White. he 
testified at the only evidentiary process taken in this case: 
PRELIMINDARY HEARING TRANSCRIPTS, DOCKET SC-2742. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1971 
MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE. PAGE 6; TRANSCRIPT PAGE -13-; RC-OOOO28: 
Questioning by Ada county prosecutor, James E. Risch: Following page: 
Witness is Allen White: 
2 
Q Coulcl you tell us please \vhat occurred when you approached tl1e 
hoxing arena area? 
/1. ~lotl-iing. 
Q \/hat clid you observe v;hen you got there? 
/\ \/ell, the door was lockeci from the inside, the shade v,as dravm 
over the window. I knocked on the door and r1aci k was l ool<i ng out 
the idnclov,. I heard him plainly rer.iark, "The screw's here," or, 
'"'It's the screw," something like that. ,1\nd I 1·1aited for 
approximately two minutes, the door was opened, at that time 
Inmate Thornell and a group of say five or six inmates whom I 
can't remember were walkinq from the shower area which was not 
(page 7)(RC-00002S), in my 'vision -- \vhere I was standing, it's 
around the corner -- just walked around the corner and asked me 
what I wanted. Because of the tension in the yard and because at 
that moment I felt there \Jas -- there was something more to --
to this than ~;ust plain "soua1v'<ie" or pills or something, I told 
them that I \vas loo'<ina for Officer Feredat and he told me :,e 
wasn't in there so I le~t. 
Q Mov1, you referred to an indiviclual by the name of Macik. Is he 
present here in the courtroom? 
A Yes, right over by powers here. 
FURTHER TESTH10tiY FROM THE PRELH1HJARY HEARitlG TRMJSCRIPT: ( PAGE 47 thru Page 49 
TRA~ISCRIPT PAGES -5~ thru -56; RC-000069 to RC-000071): James E. Risch questioning 
Officer Allen Hhite: 
Q At the time you tried it and became aware that it was locked from 
the insic'e, at that time c'icl you knov, anyone else was insirle 
there? Or anyone was inside there? 
fl t!o, not t"lat particulare time. 
Q Hhat clid you do after you found that it was locked from the inside? 
A Hell, I'cl obviously assumed that someone ,,as in there but I -- I 
dicln't know for sure you know if this was so until Macik, Inmate 
r1aci'<, puller bac'< the curtain and --
Q And that's the curtain that's on the window in the door? 
A Yes. Yes. 
Q Had you knocked on the door or banger on it or said anything? 
A Yes. Yes, I knocked on the door. 
Q Diel you say anything? 
/\ t!o. 
Q \las it after you knocked on the door that he pulled '.:lack the 
curtain? 
A I ~elieve so. 
Q When you looke~ in an~ saw him in the window, did you see anyone else? 
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A No, I didn't. 
Q What happened then after he pulled the curtain back? 
,A.. He exclaimed, "The screws here," or something similar to that. 
Q And then what happened? 
A I waited for a short time, I'd say approximately a minute, a 
minute and a half, two minutes, something like that, i can't 
recall. He opened the door and from the shower area Thornell and 
a group of five or six inmates came around -- came around toward 
myself. 
Q Now between the time you saw Macik and he made that remark and 
the time the door was opened, did you hear anything in there? 
A I heard muffled conversation. 
TRANSCRIPTS, SUPRA, page 50, Transcripe page -57-; RC-000072: Line 25: 
Q When the door was opened, where was Macik standing (page 51; 












Directly on the other side of it. 
Is he the one that opened the door, to your knowledge? 
I believe so. 
Has there any other person standing around him or ir 
vicinity to him at that time? 
near 
As best as I can recall, I think 
was that let me in, I believe it was 
now, I think they were -- they were 
inmates came out of the shower area. 
I think Macik or whoever it 
Macik but I'm not real sure 
by thei rse 1f and a group of 
Had you been in the boxing room before they came out of the 
shower area? 
I think I -- I -- they came out the same time I was coming in. 
Did they come out together or one at a time? 
Together. Together. 
And how close did they get to you? 
Well, a few feet. 
Q How long were you in the boxing room? 
A Oh, for as long as it took me to find out that Fereday wasn't --
that nobody had seen Fereday. Like I say, about, oh, minute and a 
half. 
(SEE: PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPTS PAGES 50 thru 51; Transcript page -57-58-
RC-000072 i 000073). 
The record is clear that Ronald Lee Macik was at the door, both before Officer 
Allen White knocked on the door, and was the one who opened the door, and .. was by it! 
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The record also indicates that tlaci'< v1as also, nQ ,·Jhere near the location 
of the shower area, or t1e other side of the boxing arena opposite the door 
11acik was seen by Officer Allen Hhite standing at when he knoc'<ed on the door. A 
reading of the officers accounts when they finally found the body of Bill Butler 
clearly shovJS he v1as found in a rolled up gym mat on the other side of the 
hexing arena, opposite t 11e door vJith the \1ind0\J, near the shov1er, v1here the 
"five or six inmates v1ere coming out of the shO\ver" Mr. 11acik not being one of 
t!1em. rlaci'< at 11orst \vas 'watching for the screv1,' l\t best, a bystander on the 
opposite side of the room from the incident, as the Officer testified to. 
H0\1ever, t!1ere is clear, colorable, admissible evidence that r1acik had no 
"lanrl in the f1urrlcr. From the murderer himself! 
PRELiflIN/IRY HEARING TRANSCRIPTS DOCKET SC-2742; SUPRA, pages 148 thru 150; 
Transcript pages -154- to -156-, and attached here as Attachment #5. ENTIRE 
TRAJ!SCRIPT OF PRELI11H!ARY HE/\RitlG ATTACHED ,A,S ATTACHMENT #6) (RC-000020-000230). 
Questioning by James E. Risch to Ada County Sheriff, Paul Bright: 
Q Sheriff, would you please then reiterate for us the dialogue that 
occurrccl after you turned on the, tape recorder, refreshing your 
memory from the notes that you have please? 
A The -- the conversation after? 
Q You turned on the tape recorder, yes. 
~ Do you want this verbatim? 
Q Yes. 
/I "This is Paul Sri ght, Sheri ff of Ada County. The time is 6: 05 on 
September the 24th, 1971. I'm talking to Danny powers at the Idaho 
State Penitentiary. Danny has requested that I come up and vi sit 
with him concerning the 8ill Butler murder. 
Danny, I have a card here called the Miranda warning i1hich says 
you have a right to remain silent, anything you say can and will 
be used against you in the court of l avJ, you have the right to 
talk to a lawyer and have him present with you and if you cannot 
afford it one will be appointed to represent you before any 
questioning if you wish one. Do you understand this Danny? Yes. 
Do you still wish to talk to me at this time? Yes. 
D:.rnny, briefly, you said you wanted to talk to me at the Ada 
County Jail :inct \vould tell me briefly" -- pardon -- "and v1ould 
tell me briefly what this concerns? About a murder, about Butler's 
murder. 
Yes, and what about it? Because I'm the one that done it. 
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You're the one that did it? Yes. 
And this is the thing that you wanted to talk to me about, right? 
Yes. 
And vJhy was it that you did kill Butler? Becasue he was" --
vulgarity word, do you want it included? 
Q Yes, read it right into the record. 
A "Because he was fucking a friend of mine. 
Doing what? Fucking. 
Oh, I see. Then when we're down to the" -- correction. 
"Oh, I see. Then when we're down at the Ada County jail talking 
about this will you give me the name of this individual and 
other pertinent information. right? Right. 










Sheriff, did you again then have occasion to talk with Mr. 
Powers at the Sheriff's office September 25th, 1971? 
I did. 
And where did this take place? 
In my office at the Ada County Courthouse. 
And who was present at that time? 
There was Detective Rodenbaugh and Detective Wells, Sergant 
We 11 s. 
And, Sheriff, did you tape this conversation that you had with 
Mr. Powers? 
I did. 
PRELIMIMARY HEARING TRANSCRIPTS, PAGE 148 thru 150; ENTIRE 
TRANSCRIPT ATTACHED AS ATTACHMENT #6)(RC-000020 to 000230) 
Mr. Macik points out that Sheriff Paul Bright tapped and then transcribed 
interrogations of Macik himself on September 25, 1971; of Co-defendant Bill Burt 
a 1 so on September 25, 1971; and of Co-defendant Danny Powers on September 26, 
1971. Maci k submitted each of these as exhibits #8; #9; and #10. to each of his 
pleadings, including the present case. (See: Preliminary hearing Transcripts; 
page 154, line's 10-16.) 
Sheriff Paul Bright stated that it was Powers confession that broke the 
case. (PT-page 199, line 10-11). And that there was no other incriminating 
statment except Powers's in Sheriff's interviews. (PT-page 193, line 13 thru 23). 
r1r. Macik points out that at various times the Sheriff testifies that he 
taped all conversations while the tape recorder vJas on, and other times he 
testified that there were times it was not on. (See PRELIMINARY HEARING 
TRANSCRIPTS Pages 165, 166, and page 167: RC-000186; 000187; 000188). 
This is relevant in this case because the Appellant has claimed, and 
maintaines that at one of these interrogation interviews, at the Ada County 
Courthouse, Ada County Prosecutor, James E. Risch i ntered and i ntervi e\ved him 
\vithout counsels presence, and coerced him, threatening him "That if You don't 
plead guilty tocay, to First Degree Murder, I'r.1 going to make sure you get the 
death penalty." If the tape v1as off sometimes, and not all conversations Here 
tapped, the reality that this coercion took place is a clear possibility. That 
claimn that it took place on the date of the plea of not guilty, March 23, 1972, 
at the Ada County Courthouse, is a very real possibility, and can be checked from 
the records. However, the former prosecutor, now Senator Jim Risch, has recently 
stated in a public interview: (IDAHO STATESMAN Monday November 4, 2013 Page AB) 
"Ron riacik was probably one of the worst guys I ever 
prosecuted," the Republican lawmaker said last vJeek. "He 1vas 
a bad, bad person." But the suggestion he climbed the 
Depression-era courthouse's steps toots top-floor jail cells 
to pressure Macik into a guilty plea is pure fiction, the 
Republican lav1maker said. "I did not visit inmates in the Ada 
County Jail, for obvious reasons," Risch said. "I 1vould have 
been disbarred for contacting a client represented by an 
attorney. I remember that I did not do that." 
Mr. r1acik points out that on page 196 of the transcripts the Sheriff states 
he does not turn the tape off when i nterroga ting. Hov1ever, on page 166 line 1-
5, he state he doesn't tape sometimes, and again on page 174, line 4 thru 11 he 
states he doesn't tape sometimes. And on pages 183 thru 183 he claims he has no 
memory of ahy conversations while the tape is off. As to f1r. Macik being 
interrogated by officials without counsel, Macik submits the following portion of 
the Preliminary hearing transcripts. 
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PRELH1HJARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT, pages 195 thru 196; Transcript pages -201- & 
-202-; RC-000216; 000217): 
Line 6: Q Sheriff, again calling your attention to that statement, you 
will note I believe on page 2 or page 3 that prior to Mr. 
Macik making any "incriminating" statments he flat out said 
"I want a 1 awyer." Hhy did you proceed after he made that 
request? 
A Because he said, "I needn't and I already have one, Mr. 
Redford. 
"Right. 
"Now that you stated that you did want to talk to me? 
"Yeah. 
"In other words, you are here at your request, not mine? 
"No, it's more complicated than that. There's a lot to it. I 
never talked to my attorney about it because it never came up 
before." 
Q At that point in time or any time during that particular 
evening did you in fact attempt to contact an attorney on 
behalf of Mr. Macik? 
A No, Sir. 
Q Why not? 
A He didn't ask for an attorney. That is, he didn't ask for a 
specific attorney. it's recorded here, each thing that he 
said. 
The Appellant, Ronald Lee Macik, submitted all the evidence above, along with 
an actual innocence claim, in each of his attempts to seek justice with the state 
courts. Furthermore, the Clerks Record indicates that in the original case, on 
March 9, and March 30, 1972 he both submittedf motions and requested examination 
and appearnace for mental Defect. Macik also submitted a Motion for Judgment of 
Acquittal on Grounds of Mental Defect on September 8, 1972 and it was denied on 
that same day. 
Macik was in fact at the Ada County Courthouse on August 31, 1972, and in 
fact was met by former prosecutor James E. Risch, without counsel, and that after 
that meeting, and on the same day, he went in and plead guilty to First Degree 
Murder. Even though, he,knew we1tas the Prosecutor,that he v,as not guilty of it. 
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Mr. Macik points out that the Preliminary hearing Transcript testimony of 
prison officials stipulates that the body of the deceased was found rolled up in a 
gym mat, at the southwest area of the boxing arena, (TT-page 49 thru 51), which is 
just south of the shower area, vJhich is located on the west wall of the area. The 
door with the window and curtain, that Macik moved out of the way and was seen by 
the officer, is on the north wall. (TT-page 42 line 10 thru 15). 
Testimony verifies that when Macik opened the door, the officer seen four or 
five inmates coming out together from the shower area, opposite the door on the 
other side of the room, and those inmates blocked his view from seeing the 
rolled-up gym mat, behind them. Macik \vas the one whom opened the door, by 
himself, and had just looked through the vJi ndow before he opened the door, when 
the officer knocked, and was seen by the officer doing so. (See above references). 
To put it plainly! Mr. Macik v1as at the door when the officer tried the 
door handle and realized it was locked from the inside, and when he knocked, Macik 
v1as the one who looked out the window, and the one who opened the door after 
te 11 i ng the others that their \tas a screw at the door. Or, "The Screv,s here." 
Screw being the term prisoner's often use to describe a prison cop or officer. 
Macik was not in the shower area, nor near the mat, nor did he have any blood 
on him. No weapon or fingerprints or evidence was ever produced to establish that 
Macik took a physical part in the murder, other than him accompanying Butler to 
the boxing arena area, as Butler was accustomed to demanding from others. 
The court minutes (See: Attachment #12 & #13), indicate that Macik never gave 
direct evidence that he actually killed Butler. Furthermore, at the plea hearing 
as \'Jell as all hearings, including the preliminary hearing, Mr. Macik was under 
forced administration of medication (Thorzine) by the prison officials, due in 
part to the court order to have him evaluated for mental defect. He was in no 
instance, cognitive mentally, or knowingly a participant. And only through threat. 
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The trial court in this instant case, as \vell as those cases preceeding this 
one, has taken judicial notice of the underlying criminal record, the preliminary 
hearing transcripts, as well as those affidavits, letters, and record relevant to 
the case. The Idaho Court of Appeals and Idaho Supreme Court has done so as well. 
These facts as related above are properly before the court, were submitted in 
full through excerpts of the transcripts to the district court bel0v1, multiple 
times. 
The Appellant has and does submit Factual, Admissible Evidence, and a 
colorable claim of Innocence. Ho\vever, the question consitently raised by the 
court, is whether Macik is barred, not \1hether he is innocent. Those facts which 
point to his innocence, are overlooked, while at the same time, the court and the 
state suggest that there are no facts in dispute, \Vhen in fact there are. t1acik 
has not been provided any evidentiary hearing at any time. He has also been denied 
an effective amendment or post-conviction presentation. J\t all times relevant to 
these proceedings, t1r. r1acik has been unable, due to mental defect to present his 
case In Propria persona. He has consitently been at the mercy of the court to 
propound that his npl eadi ngs be converted and amended properly, \Jhi ch they have 
not. As the statment of the Course of the Proceedings (belov1) will shov,, the only 
time any counsel appointed amended anything, they simply submited a tv,o page 
post-conviction with no law or authority or conversion whatsoever, and one page of 
the petition was in fact the certificate of service. Counsel simply did as fiacik 
had heen doing, su~mitting petition and motion after motion and petition, 
attaching his letters and affidavit and excerpts of t~e transcripts to it. On each 
occasion, the court assigned a new case number, as well as the appeals court, and 
renied any actequate processes. And completely overlooked any application of an 
actual innocence standard of review, even though r1acik asserted such at the onset, 
and federalized his claim \vith authority. 
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COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The recore' inricatcs a r.iurrer case filing on ;~ugust lll, 1971. the follo\Jing 
r.1ont!1 on September 2l'th ancl 25th, 1971 Transcribed interrogation tapes are made 
ancl su':lmittec! hy the ,".r.a County Prosecutor, James E. Risch and Sheriff Paul 
l1ri~l1t. four rays later a cor.iplaint is filer on Septer..ber 29, lS7l hased on a 
brea~ in the case hy the confession of Danny Powers. A preliminary hearing is held 
ancl continuer on tlovember 23, 1S71 at \Jhich tir.ie Risch requested and t!1e court 
granted a request to excluclc the Press anc' the Public from the proceedings. 
On February 25, E'72, another prelir.iinary hearinr \Jas conductec, at v1hich 
tioe it was transcriber' and transferrer along with the affidavits and supporting 
interrogation tapes anc' evirence. On riarch ?, 1972 the parties 1r1ere arraigned in 
district court. On t::c Sth of i1arch, 197? not.ice vrns given of r:iental cefect of the 
refonrant Ronalc' Lee ilaci'<, ·anr a motion v,as filer in that regarcl on march 30, 
1972. 1'.otion for c'efensc of mental defect was eventually denier by t~e court. 
f1aci'< plear not guilty along v1ith refencant lli1liar.i Burt, on rlarch ?3, 1S'7?. 
On April 21, 197? the court orrerec' a mental exam of c'efenrlant r!acik. nacik hac:' 
alreac'y 1een placed on Thorzin '1y prison officials after t'.1e riot the previous 
year. T'1e r:ienta l hea 1th exam anc' report v,as subr:ii ttec ,1une 5, 1S72 and rlaci k \JaS 
ordered to stancl trial. Macik's counsel ahd submitted evidence of macik's nental 
:iealth issues going back to childhooc', and his placement in a mental health 
institution, to \1it, Torrance State Hospital in Pennsylvania \Jhen he l'Jas a child, 
as \vell as correctional institution for juveniles. The court risregard these 
reports, and also rid not take them or r1aciks ability to coi~prel1end the 
proceec'ings heing under the influence of induced Thorzine. 
On July 17, 1S72 a filotion vms filecl and granted on ,)uly 27, 1S72 to have 
rlaci'< transporter to t:1e /1 .. ra County jail, fror.i segregation and isolation at the 
state penitentiary. lie Has transported on .~ugust 2r, 1972. 
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Three days later, after consultaion with the Ada County Prosecutor, James E. 
Risch, and Sheriff Paul Bright, Macik plead guilty to First Degree Murder after 
withdrawing his plea to avoid the death penalty. Counsel was not present during 
negotiations, on August 31, 1972. 
On September 8, 1972 Macik filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquital on Grounds 
of Mental Defect, this motion was denied the same day. The state has refused to 
provide anything more than minutes of the hearings, and no exam report or 
evaluation done at the time of the courts denials. 
On September 13, 1972 Danny pov1ers plead guilty to the actual murder of Bill 
Butler and gave account on record that he was in fact the murderer. On that same 
ctay, a verdict of guilty vJas entered against Powers and Macik both. Macik and 
Powers \vere ':JOth also sentenced. Macil< sentenced, September 14, 1972 to life in 
prison for first degree murder, and the judgment was filed. Powers same on the 21st 
1972. William Burt plead guilty to 2nd degree murder on October 19, 1972, and was 
sentenced to 30 years. Judgment entered the next day October 20, 1972. Appeal was 
taken for Powers, and transcripts were completed and served June 28, 1972. Macik 
was never given an appeal, direct or otherwise. 
On December 3rd, 1972, two months after pleading guilty, and after the time 
for filing a direct appeal had passed, and all the vJhile being held in isolation 
and segregation at the Idaho State pen south of Boise, Idaho. Macik was 
transferred to a federal penitentiary in Lewisburg, PA. Hhere he remained until 
released on parole the first time. 
Macik first contacted the Ada County court and Public Defenders office in 
July and August of 199l! in an attempt to obtain records of his conviction and 
sentence in order to address the manifest injustice of his conviction and 
sentence. Few records were provided. And no transcripts at all. 
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Based on Macik's failure to obtain any records of substance concerning his 
case he resigned himself to his fate. Fifteen years later, Macik came upon 
co-defendant Danny Powers, whom informed him that he had in fact admitted to the 
murder, gave evidence and account of the same on record, and promised to provide 
Macik with parts of the relevant transcript of the preliminary hearing. 
After receiving further evidence concerning his innocence on record, Macik 
sent a letter first, and than a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Ada 
county Court, requesting special proceedings regarding an actual innocence claim. 
District Court case number CV-HC-2011-08579. The court denied service to 
respondents and dismissed the petition outright. Daniel C. Hurlbutt Jr. presiding. 
Order of Dismissal filed on June 2, 2011. On June 28, 2011 Macik filed a Motion to 
Reconsider appointment of counsel on appeal, after filing his Notice of Appeal 
timely on June 15, 2011. Macik also sought clarification of the order of 
dismissal. The court issued an Order Re: Motions on July 19, 2011 clarifying its 
position on habeas Corpus in Idaho not being a remedy for appeal. The disregarded 
Maciks actual innocence claim altogether. 
On appeal, S.Ct. Docket tlo. 38908-2011, the Supreme Court issued an order 
Conditionally Dismissing Appeal. July 28, 20ll: "appears not to be warranted by 
exisitn law, as required under I.A.R., 11.2." Macik was given 21 days to respond. 
he did so with an Objection to Order, requesting reconsideration. Making a federal 
claim and asserting actual innocence, on August 9, 2011. On August 29, 2011 the 
Court issued an order Dismissing Appeal of Application for Writ Of Habeas Corpus. 
The grounds given were the same as in the original order. "Not warranted by 
existing law." Remittitur issued September 21, 2011. There being no remedy in lavJ 
Petitioner Macik filed his documents and requests for justice in the Idaho Federal 
District Court. Case No. l:94-CV-503-BLW. The Petition was dismissed claiming lack 
of jurisdiction. Petitioner Macik submitted again, Case No. 1:08-CV-00360-EJL. 
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This time, the Federal Court denied relief on the grounds that Macik had failed to 
t authorization from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to 
file a successive petition. The Court ordered that the clerk provide Petitioner 
with a successive petitions form to be filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, on December 6, 2013. (See: Attachment #14). 
Petitioner r1acik submitted his application to the Ninth Circuit and the Court 
of /\ppeals issuer an Order in Case tlo. 13-7~,359, on February 27, 2014, declaring 
that it v1as unnecessary for successive petition. Ordering that "If petitioner 
files a habeas petition in the district court c11allenging his 1972 conviction, 
petitioner shall provide the district court with a copy of this order." (See: 
Order in RmL~LD LEE ri/\CIK V. L1/\SON ELLIS, NO. 13-74359: Attachment #15). 
In the interm, r1acik had filed a request to the /\.da County District Court in 
the form of a 1 etter on narch 14, 2011. This action was submitted using the 
previous case no. 4949, and \vas refiled by the court as CRFE-1971-4949, and the 
court appointed counsel, and the action was designated a fiction To Hithdraw Guilty 
Pl ea. On September 8, 2011 !!onorab 1 e Judge Copsey denied the r1oti on pursuant to a 
1 ack of juri sdi cti on cl aim. Counsel at no time amended the cl aims. flacik appealed 
through the Ac!a County Public Defenders office, September 28, 2011. The State 
Appellate Public Defendaers office v1as assigned, Docket No. 39233. An Appellant's 
Rrief was prepared, on the grounds of a manifest injustice. (See: Attachment #16); 
The Idaho Court of ,Appeals affirr:ied the dismissal and issued its Order may 24, 
2012. Docket tlo. 39233. (See: Attachment #17). /\ Remitti tur was issued June 12, 
2012. /\ Petition For Reviev, v,as filed L1une 6, 2012, on BRIEFS ALREADY FILED, and 
The Idaho Supreme Court denied the petition June 11, 201?. (See: Attachment #18). 
f1aci'< than compilecl his letters, dated 1994; June 9, 2009; rlarch 14, and 
/\pril 2011; /1nd drafted a VERIFIED MOTIOM TO REOPEtl C/\SE B/\SED otl MEI/LY DISCOVERED 
EVIDEtJCE REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HE/\.Rit!G, detailing out his clair.is.(Attachment #4) 
ltl 
nacil< ferleralized his Affidavit with Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 
(1984); and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966); and U.S. v. howard, 381 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2004); and Dziurgot v. 
Luther, 897 F.2d 1222 (1st Cir. 1990); and Lopez v. U.S., 439 F.2ct 997 (9th Cir. 
1971). Macik also asserted an actual innocence claim and violations of his 5th; 
6th; and 14th Amendment rights, argued res judicata under I.R.C.P. Rule 59(a)(4); 
and submitted genuine issues of material fact in dispute, clearly. Macik also 
argued that pursuant to West v. Statye, 123 Idaho 250 (1993), that the fact he was 
suffering from forced induced Thorzin medication, his guilty plea was 
inadmissable. /1.nd therefore his action was reviewable under a manifest injustice 
standard of review, along with an actual innocence standard. Macik's Affidavit is 
part of the record in this case. This action was filed by Macik in his previous 
action and appeal under case no. CR-FE-1971-0004949. Judge Copsey excepted the 
Affidavit which was accompanyined by a Motion For Counsel, and assigned counsel on 
October 24, 2012, using the same case numher of the previous case. This action was 
considered a ~1otion For A New Trial by the state and they filed an Objection on 
Novemhver 30, 2012, in which they attached the minutes from the original criminal 
case showing Macik plead guilty, without evidence of any actual detailed admission 
or account of the crime as defendant Danny powers had done. 
Macik \·Jrote counsel a number of times, requesting proper amendments and 
action in the cqse. (See: Attachment #19). And Macik vwote to the court, judge 
Copsey, Received in Chambers, May 28, 2013 asking for counsel to be ordered to 
withdraw or do their job. (See: Attachment #20). A hearing was conducted adfter 
the case was designated REOPENED December J.8, 2012. On january 16, 2013, Judge 
Copsey denied the Motion For a new Trial after a Telephonic hearing. A transcript 
was ordered prepared, January 23, 2013. 
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On ,July 26, 2012 f1aci'< filed a petition for Post-Conviction relief. Macik 
submitted his actual innocence claim along with an affidavit asserting the 
circumstances surrounding his guilty plea. Case No. CV-PC-2012-13953. The same 
court, Judge Copsey presiding, dismissed the petition outright on August 27, 2012. 
maci '< appealed. In Idaho court of ,11.ppea ls Docket No. Ll0321-2012. the Idaho Court 
of Appeals issued an opinion on October 211-, 2012, ruling that macik should have 
been given a chance to amend his petition in response to the states request to 
summary dismissal. The case was remanded for further proceedings. (See Unpublished 
opinion No. 722; docket t!o. 4032l)(Attahcment #21). 
On remancl, Macik submitted to the district an P.ffidavit, Docket No. 40321, 
and requested counsel also, dated Nover.iber 6, 2013. Docket No. 41705 RC-000005 
thru OC0006 r OOOOOA. (See: Attachment #9 & Attachment #10) 
In case CV-PC-2012-13953 on remand, the district court denied counsel; 
RC-000010 Case No. Ll1705. In doing so the court attached copies of Maciks letters, 
and institutional transfer record fror.i federal prison. The court also included a 
ROA Report from Case No. CR-FE-1971-0004949 RC-000039-40. 
On December 10, 2013 Judge Copsey Conditionally dismissed r1aci!<'s petition. 
the court neither attached i1acik's Verified Affidavit, nor took into account his 
nev, Affidavit in support. The court did take judicial notice of the preliminary 
hearing transcripts, and Macik's guilty plea. RC-000045. The court dismissed the 
petition January 7, 20M, after f1aci'< filed a Notice of Appeal in the case on 
December 17, 2013. CV-PC-13953. RC-000072. 
l\t no time in the district courts analysis did jud0e copsey apply an actual 
innocence standard of review, or Petitioner's issues in that context. Furthermore, 
the court completely disregarded 1!acik's inability and mental deficiencies in that 
he is unable to comply v1ith legal requirements of ar.1endments and responses or 
those deman~s put on him by the court, in any respect. 
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Judge Copsey issued her judgment on August 27, 2012. Macik promptly filed an 
appeal, Docket No. 40321-2012. An opinion was issued October 24, 2013 on remand 
due to Copsey' s failure to allow notice prior to dismissal and amendment. On 
remand Copsey again denied evidentiary and proper analysis, dismissing the 
petition January 7, 2014. Counsel was appointed on appeal but withdrew, conflict. 
Although the Supreme Court had stayed all proceedings until the counsel issue was 
decided. Judge Copsey denied amendment and counsel in the parallel case, and 
entered her judgment of dismissal while the case was stayed by the Supreme Court. 
Macik submitted a Motion For Joinder of Docket No. 41154-2013 with Docket No. 
41705-2013. Said Motion was denied. 
Due to the fact that Judge Copsey refused to take judicial notice of Macik's 
Verified Motion To Reopen Case Based on Newly Discovered Evidence Request For 
Evidentiary Hearing. (Seez Docket No. 41154, RC-000005 thru 000011), or the 
Affidavit In Support of his Remanded petition, Docket No. 41705, RC-000005-6 & 
Request for Counsel RC-000008, Docket No. 41705 & Remand 40371). Macik submitted 
a Successive Petition which is also on appeal in above case. CV-PC-2013-02544. 
In this current case, Macik was not given counsel to amend, nor given time to 
amend, or allowed to do anything, as the case was stayed by Order of the Supreme 
Court until the day that Judge Copsey dismissed it. The reason for this is that 
when counsel was denied, Macik appealed that order, and so the case was pending 
(stayed) until that appeal was denied for counsel, than dismissed wtihout 
allowing amendment or counsel, or evidentiary processes, including denial of 
discovery. Copsey does make not of Macik's actual innocence claim, without 
applying the prjnciples that support such a claim. 
The entire underlying criminal case has been jdicially noticed. Therefore, 
this appeal is appeal of Macik 's first and original post-conviction, not 
successive per say, although not improper, as there has been no fact's determined 
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The stated filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Request for Judicial 
notice of the entire underlying criminal case. It should be noted that the state 
relied upon its Objection to Motion For New Trial, filed in case CR-FE-0004949, 
filed Novbember 30, 2012 as their argument to deny Appellant the right to amend, 
and asked that it be incorporated therein. RC-000015 thru RC-000019, filed 
February 20, 2013. Case No. CV-PC-2013-02644, Docket No. 41154. 
The district court Judge Copsey, Dismissed the successive petition in case 
CV-PC-2013-02644 on May 14, 2013. Macik timely appealed on June 26, 2013 through 
the Ada County public Defenders office. Same counsel, D. Dave Lorello. 
The Appellant moved the Supreme court to join the above mentioned cases, but 
was denied. Appellant's causes have not been answered in any of the cases, 
dismissed or pending, and no discovery has been permitted, or inquiry into his 
claims. Any counsel that has been appointed has failed to protect Macik's rights, 
amend properly, or address any issue raised in the affidavit's and evidence. 
The Supreme Court ordered briefing on the prior case, Docket 41154-2013, 
which has been filed, reply received, and response by macik is pending. In the 
present case, Docket No. 41705-2013, the Appellant received no Order for briefing 
at all until only recently, he received an Order dated August 15, 2014 stating he 
had been ordered already to file his initial brief in the present case, but he 
has not received any such order, the prison mail records will reflect this. 
In any case, due to the present order, his brief is now due by August 29, 
2014, and so the Appellant has prepared his brief. 
Therefore, the Appellant submits the following argument and authority in 
support of his actual innocence claim in order to exhaust and comply with the 
Ninth Circcuit Order no. 13-74359. Attached as #14 & #15. 
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ISSUE ONE 
THE DIST!HCT c:curn ERRED IN orsmssrnG rm. f'./\.CIK'S ~ PETITIOfl 
\JITHOUT /IPPLYii!G ,~J! .'1.CTL'/\L Hlf!OCnJCE ST/\t!DARD C'F REVIE!/~ AND/OR ALLOWING AN 
AMENDMENT PRIOR TO DISMISSAL! 
J\RGUMErlT 
The :'l.ppellant has subr.1itter that his court appointee counsel, and every 
counsel appointer since his conviction has been ineffective and in fact 
conspiratorial in nature, hy supporting the states position to convict anr reny 
appellate processes. the recorr inricates that counsel has done nothing to either 
protect appellants rights or ret to the truth of this case. Consistent complaints 
to the court in this regarr ~ave ,,ent unhearec completely, anr most often, counsel 
has heen renier altorether. 
The lJniter States Supreme Court has 11elc that: ,11_ r,roc2e'urally defaulted 
ineffective-assistance claim can serve as cause to excuse the procerural refault 
of anot'.'ler '1aheas claim only if t'.1e haheas petitioner can satisfy the "cause anc 
pre/uricc" stanrard ~,ith respect to the ir.effoctive-assistance claim itself. T'12 
procerural c'efault roctrine anc' its attencant "cause anr pre,iuric2" standard are 
r,:roundcc in comity anc' federalisr., conc2rns, Coler.ian v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 
730, anc' apply \/1et'1er the default occurrer at trial, on appeal, or on state 
collateral attac 1<, f1urray v. r . ~arr, er, /17] u. s. /1.78. r:SC-49?. Counsel's 
ineffec+iveness in failing properly to preserve a cluir.i for state-court revie11 
tlill sufice as caL:se, 1-iut only if that ineffectiveness itself constitutes an 
indepenc'cnt constitutional clair.1. Carrier, su[)ra, at 
Tneffective-assi stancve claims server as cause to excuse the clefaul t of the 
sufficicncy-of-thc-evircnce clai~, ~~ether or not the former clair.i had ~een 
procerurally c'cfaulterl, because resroncent hac exhaustcc t hn ;1-
ineffective-assistance claiLl by presenting it to the state courts in his 
application to reo;Jcn +he cirec:: appca 1. Fi nring pre,-iucfi cc fror.1 counsel's failure 
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to raise the sufficiency-of-the-evidence clai~ on direct appeal, it directed the 
strict f:ourt to i ssuc e 1;1ri t conditioned uron the state court's according 
respondent a new culrability hearin9. See: Edwards v. Carpenter, 52E U.S. ~~6. 120 
S.Ct. 15r?, 1M L.Ed.?d 518 (?C'CO). L1ustice Scalia deliverec' the opinion of the 
Court. 
The Appellant has clearly submitted letters on r;iultiple occasions to the 
court about counsels failures anr refusals to ar.iend the petitions. The itself 
attac!1ed these letters tot 11eir decisions barring revie\/. they are a r:.atter of 
record and therefore, plainly and properly suhQitted as inde~edant clains to the 
state courts. Th.:: One (J) page ar.1endr.ient itself suffices to point to counsels 
failures to present appellants clair.is. 
Appellants colorahle clain of innocence, and the evidence establishing it, 
were properly hefore the state courts on multiple occasions. The failure to regar~ 
it, souly hasec on procec'ural hars \Jus anr is ir.iproper. /\ppcllant ar0ues t:1at a 
crec'ible:: shmJin0 of "actual innocence" ur.rer Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 2Sfl, 115 
S.Ct. ?~J, 1 :C L.Ec'.?c' rcr (1ssr:), excuses t!:e statute of lir.1itations perior 
establsihec' by t~c Antiterrorism an~ Effective Death Penalty Act of JS9C 
(".A,.E[)P."."), ?fl ~'.S.C. : ??/11 ct sec;. This /1ppellant dic! not r;r2t an evirentiary 
hearing to present '1is evidence, '1m,evcr, :1e !1as suhr:1itted enough evicence to 
support his clair.1 altoc-ether, 1;ithout one. 
The ~ppellant argues that a crec'ihle claim of actual innocence constitutes an 
equitahle exception to AEDPA's liGitations period, and a petitioner ,,ho ~akes such 
a s!1ovling rnay pass t!1roush the SChlup gate1Juy anr have his otl1Gn;ise tir.1e-barrec 
claims heard on t 11e r:1erits in rccosnizinc- o.n 2e;uitarilc exception based on a 
crerihle shmJinc of actual innocence. See: Lee v. Lar.,hcrt, G33 F.:?d 1170 (Sth Cir. 
?()J1l; Paulino v. l:arrison, f:/!?. F.?r 0g?,'.5Sfl (Sth Cir. ?008). 
2C 
The United States Supreme Court has instructed, AEDPA's statute of 
limitations is subject to equitable exceptions "in appropriate cases." Holland v. 
Florida, U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 2549,2560; Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952,959 (9th 
Cir. 2010). Because §2244(d) is not jurisdictional, it is "subject to a 
'rebuttable ~resi;i.lll1;1Jti©'a' in favor' of equitable tolling. "'Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 
2560(quoting Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,95-96, 111 S. ~3, 
112 L.Ed.2d 435 (1990)). 
The actual innocence exception 'serves as an additional safeguard against 
compelling an innocent man to suffer an unconstitutional loss of liberty,' 
guarnateeing that the ends of justice will be served in full." McCleskey v. Zant, 
11-99 U.S. 467,at 495, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 0991); (quoting Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U.S. 465,492-93, n. 31, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.td~2d 1067 (1976)). 
As the Court warned in Holland: Id. at 2562. "It is difficult to imagine a 
stronger equit2ble claim for keeping open the courthouse doors than one of actual 
innocence. "the ultimate equity on the prisoner's side." ~1ithrow v. Hilliams, 507 
!.J.S. 680,7(10. 113 S.Ct. 1745, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)(0'Connor, .J., concurr~ng in 
part and dissenting in part) (noting tha.t the Supreme Court "continuously has 
recogn 1 zed tha·t, a sufficient s:1owing of actual innocence" is norm.:\l"y enough, 
11 stancli n9 al 0n2, to oub,ei gh o Lher concerns and justify adjudi c:ati on of t'1e 
prisoner's constitutional claim"). Indeed, "the inrlfvi,Jual interest in avoirJing 
injustice is most co~pelling in the context of actual innccen:c." Schlup, 513 U.S. 
at 324. 
When Congress codified new rules governing this previously judicially managed 
area of law, it did so wihtout losing sight of the fact that the "writ of habeas 
corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional rights." it did not seek to 
end every possible delay at all costs. Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562 (quoting Slack 
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 {2000). 
21 
.l\n actua 1 innocence exception to the l imitations provisions does not foster 
se or delay, hut instead recognizes that in extraordinary cases, the social 
interests of finality, comity, and conserving judicial resources 'must yield to 
the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration." Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). 
Finally, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance requires us to construe the 
statute, if possible, to avoid a serious constitutional question. See Pub, Citizen 
v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466, 109 s.ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 
(1989)("it has long been an axiom of statutory interpretation that where an 
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional 
problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such 
constrution is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." As our sister circuits 
have observed, denying federal habeas relief from an actually innocent petitioner 
would be "consatitutionally problematic." Souter, 395 F.3d at 601-02 (collecting 
cases); see e.g., vlyzykowski v. Dep't of Corr., 226 F.3d 1213, 1218 (11th 
Cir.?.OOO)(noting that barring a habeas petitioner who can show actual innocence, 
but who filed after AEDP/\'s limitations period, "raises concerns because of the 
inherent injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person, and the 
technological advances that can provide compelling evidence of a person's 
onnocence." In Schlup, the Supreme Court noted: 
[C]oncern about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent 
person has long been at the core of our criminal justice system. That concern is 
reflected, in the "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far 
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." 513 U.S. at 
325 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368(1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
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In order to present otherwise time-barred claims to a federal habeas court 
under Schlup, a petitioner must produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence 
to bring him "within the 'narrow class of cases. implicating a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice."' 513 U.S. at 314-15 (quoting Mccleskey, 499 U.S. at 494). 
the evidence of innocence must be "so strong that a court cannot have confidence 
in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was 
free of nonharmless constitutional error." Id. at 316. 
To pass through the Schlup gateway, a "petitioner must show that it is more 
li~ely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of 
the new evidence." Id. at 327; house, 547 U.S. at 538. This exacting standard 
"permits review only in the extraordinary' case," but it does not require absolute 
certainty about the petitioner's guilt or innocence." House, 547 U.S. at 538 
(quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327). As we have previously said, "where 
post-conviction evidence casts doubt on the conviction by undercutting the 
reliability of the proof of guilt, but not by affirmatively proving innocence, 
that can be enough to pass through the Schlup gateway to allow consideration of 
otherwise barred claims." Sistrunk v. /\rmenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 673 (9th Cir. 
2002)(en banc)(citing Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478-79 (9th Cir. 1997)(en 
bane)) . 
Sehl up requires a petitioner "to support his a 11 egati ons of constituti ona 1 
error with new reliable evidence--whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, 
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence--that was not 
presentedf at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. The habeas court then "consider[s] 
all the evidence, old and new, incriminating and exculpatory," admissible at trial 
or not. House, 547 U.S. at 538 (internal quotation marks omitted); Carriger, 132 
F.3d at 477-78. On this complete record, the court makes a"'probabilistic 
determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.'" House, 
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547 U.S. at 538 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329). 
The Appellant submits that he has produced just such evidence. Not only 
material evidence that he was not a parta~er in the murder itself, but also, that 
another person, at the time of the murder admitted to authorities that he was the 
one who committed the crime. Other i ndi vi duals that may or may not have been 
involved at the time, are not relevant to Appellants claim. It is only relevant 
that the Appellant was not the murderer, was incapaciated at the time of his plea, 
both mentally, and through coercion. And that fear alone played a part in pleading 
guilty. The petitioner/Appellant submitted this evidence as soon as it was 
available to him, albeit, in unorthadox methods, but submitted as an Affidavit, 
with colorable admissible evidence, as is nrequired by the UPCPA, and the AEDPA 1 s 
requirements. tlultiple times! (See: Course of the Proceedings, above). 
The Appellant points out that although another prisoner had confessed to the 
crime, which is sometimes suspect by authorities in cases like this, it was done 
early in the case, without the full awarnesses of the Appellant. However, the 
witnesses testimony that establishes that the Appellant was on the other side of 
the room at the time of the murder and involvment of multiple other individuals, 
was an Idaho State Correctional Officer, who 1 s testimony was not than nor now, 
challenged. If the state does not want to believe a convict, than surely they must 
regard the testimony of one of their own. A boxing arena was in between the 
appellant and the incident. Not something you can jump around or move through very 
quic~ly. Certainly not when i1acik moved the curtain to see who was there the 
moment the officer knocked on the door, as testified to. This coupled with the 
admission from another prisoner to the crime, is colorable evidence of innocence. 
24 
ISSUE TWO 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MR. MACIK'S PLEA WAS KNOWING 
WILLING, AND WITHOUT DURESS. 
ARGUMENT 
The Appellant has shown that not only was his mental capacities in question 
well prior to incarceration in Idaho in 1969. It was in question at the time of 
the murder, and at the time of the trial (preliminary hearing) on the matter, he 
was committed within the prison system itself, isolated, and force medicated with 
Thorzine, which ensued during all proceedings, at the time of his plea, and even 
at sentencing and even transfer to a federal facility after sentencing. While the 
court ordered evaluations, it would appear that it was only effectual for forcing 
medication upon the Appellant, not for evaluation of his ability to stand trial, 
or even be fully aware of the proceedings and what they meant. The record is clear 
on this. No actual mental evaluation has been provided to the Appellant from any 
records within the state of Idaho. 
Mr. Maci k submits his argument from The United Staters Supreme court case: 
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). The Supreme 
Court, justice Marshall, held that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing 
that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at 
trial, due process requires that a state provide access to a psychiatrist's 
assistance on the issue, if a defendant cannot otherwise afford one. 
As the State conceded at ora 1 argument in Ake, fed era 1 cons ti tuti ona 1 errors 
are "fundamental." Tr. of oral Arg. 51-52; see Buchanan v. State, 523 P.2d 1134, 
1137 (Okla.Crim.App.1974)(violation of constitutional right constitutes 
fundamental error); see also Williams v. State, 658 P.2d 499 (Okla.Crim.App.1983). 
Thus the State has made application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent 
ruling on federal law, that is, on the determination of whether federal 
constitutional error has been committed. Before applying the waiver doctrine to a 
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constitutional question, the state court must rule, either explicitly or 
implicitly, on the merits of the constitutional question. 
As the Court indicated in the past, when resolution of the state procedural 
law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of 
the court's holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not 
precluded. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126, 65 S.Ct. 459, 463, 89 L.Ed. 
789 (1945)("We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same 
judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of 
Federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion"); 
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Cana 1 Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164, 37 
S.Ct. 318, 320, 61 L.Ed. 644 (1917)("But where the non-Federal ground is so 
interwoven with the other as not to be an independent matter, or is not of 
sufficient breadth to sustain the judgment without any decision of the other, our 
jurisdiction is plain"). In such a case, the federal law holding is integral to 
the state court's disposition of the matter, and our ruling on the issue is in no 
respect advisory. In this case, the additional holding of the state court-that 
the cons ti tuti ona l cha 11 enge presented here was waived-depends on the court's 
federal-law ruling and consequently does not present an independent state ground 
for the decision rendered. The Court therefore turned to a consideration of the 
merits of Ake's claim. 
"This Court has long recognized that when a State brings its judicial power 
to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to 
assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense. this 
elementary principle, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth Amendment's 
due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from the belief that 
justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is 
denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in 
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which his liberty is at stake. In recognition of this right, this Court held 
almost 30 years ago that once a State offers to criminal defendants the 
opportinuty to appeal their cases, it must provide a trial transcript to an 
indigent defendant if the transcript is necessary to a decision on the merits of 
the appeal. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956). 
Since then, this Court has held that an indigent defendant may not be required to 
pay a fee before filing a notice of appeal of his conviction, Burns v. Ohio, 360 
U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959), that an indigent defendant is 
entitled to the assistance of counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 779 (1963), and on his first direct appeal as of 
right, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), 
and that such assistance must be effective. See Evitts v. lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 
S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Mcmann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 105 S.Ct. 1087, 
84 L.Ed.2d 53, 53 USLW 4179 759,771, n. 14, 90 $.Ct. 1441, 1449, n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 
763 91970). Indeed, in Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2202, 68 L.Ed.2d 
627 (1981)." 
"Meaningful access to justice has been the consistent theme of these cases. We 
recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself 
assure a proper functioning of the adversary process, and that a criminal trial is 
fundamentally unfair if the state proceeds against an indigent defendant without 
making certain that he has access to the raw materials integral to the building of 
an effective defense. Thus, while the Court has not held that a State must 
purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that his wealthier 
counterpart might buy, see Ross v. moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 
L.Ed.2d 341 (1974), it has often reaffirmed that fundamental fairness entitles 
indigent defendants to "an adequate opportunity to present their claims fairly 
within the adversary system." id., at 61~
1 
94 S.Ct., at 2444. To implement this 
principle, we have focused on identifying the "basic tools of an adequate defense 
or appeal," Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 432, 433, 30 
L.Ed.2d 400 (1971), and we have required that such tools be provided to those 
defendants who cannot afford to pay for them." 
"To say that these basic tools must be provided is, of course, merely to 
begin our inquiry. In this case we must decide whether, and under what conditions, 
the participation of a psychiatrist is important enough to preparation of a 
defense to require the State to provide an indigent defendant with access to 
competent psychiatric assistance in preparing the defense. Three factors are 
relevant to this determination. The first is the private interest that will be 
affected by the action of the State. The second is the governmental interest that 
will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The third is the probable 
value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and 
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards 
are not provided. See little v. Streater, supra, 452 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. at 
2205; mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 
(1976) • II 
The Court has discussed the role that due process has played in such cases, 
and the separate but related inquiries that due process and equal protection must 
trugger. See: Evitts v. lucey; Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 
76 l.Ed.2d 221 (1983). See also Reilly v. Barry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 
165, 167 (1929)(Cardozo, C.J.)("[UJpon the trial of certain issues, such as 
insanity or forgery, experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for 
defense ... [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable because 
of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrust of those against him"). 
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Mr. Macik was not of sound mind nor represented properly while being 
interrogated by multiple officials. Furthermore, it was cinducted in violation of 
his right to have counsel present. His request for counsel was clearly ignorred 
and violated by the Sheriff's own admission under sworn testimony on record. 
Mr. Macik was in fact confronted by prosecutor James Risch, at the county 
courthouse on the day of his plea, and the idea that the prosecutor never went to 
see prisoners at the county jail, ever, is wholly without believability. it is 
exactly what prosecutors do, only usually it is done in the presence of counsel. 
The truth on file, clearly stipulates, by witnesses under oath, that Macik 
did not take part in the murder of Bill Butler. He was by the door, not over 
where the murder was obviously taking place. Furthermore, it is well established 
that of the five or six men that were at the location of the murder, right next 
to the gym mat, and coming out of the shower area, at least one of them 
admittitably confessed to the actual stabbing of Bill Butler - Danny Powers? 
When the fact that Mr. rnacik was under psyciatric evaluation, under the 
influence of induced Thorzin, was a registered mental patient with known mental 
defects, and was both questioned and coerced outside the presence of his counsel, 
and the Sheriff, paul Briught, prosecutor, James Risch, and Warden of the prison, 
Randall mays, all had a lot to explain, if the fact that they had chosen a known 
documented Sodomite at the prison to be their spokesman during and after the 
riot, had been made public, it is easy to see and understand the importance of 
the officials need to 'exclude the public and the press,' demand all those 
charged 'plead guilty and be sentenced quickly.' and than 'transferred out of 
state those whom had knowledge of the issues being muffled. Macik is innocent, 
pursuant to justice and factually innocent pursuant to the truth. he deserves 
adjudication, not another cover-up and sufferable proceedings. 
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CONCLUSION 
Macik disputes the standard used to evaluate his timeliness. He has made an 
actual innocence claim. he notified the court as soon as he bacame aware of the 
evidence, asked for counsel, and immediately filed a post-conviction when he was 
instructed to. due to the nature of the evidence, it was proper for him to first 
request a withdraw of his plea, and a review by the court of his evidence. Over 
the course of that first year, the court never advised Macik to amend his motion 
to a post-conviction nor did they appoint counsel even though theire was colorable 
evidence of his innocence. Macik was in fact kept drugged during the entire 
proceedings. And he has never admitted to possessing the weapon, using it, or 
doing the crime. The states own witnesses provide proof that Macik did in fact not 
commit the murder and the prosecutor knew it from Powers own testimony prior to 
forcing Macik to plead guilty. Both the state and now the court of appeals has 
submitted false allegations and false evidence in order not to provide evidentiary 
processes in this case. Furthermore. Macik has been impeded and denied access to 
the court to submit his claims to the court. denied evidence and transcripts, and 
harassed and prosecuted at the prison for his assertions. At no time has his 
claims and evidence been evaluated based on an actual innocence standard of review 
nor has he been given any counsel responsible enough to present the case to the 
court. At some point. the truth should be reviewed, instead of constant excuses to 
find a way not to provide Macik with at least one honest review of the facts as 
they relate to the conviction. In any context. Macik is not the murderer, nor did 
he kill Butler. and therefore the conviction cannot stand. 
Macik has provided enough proof to warrant his day in court, a clear look at 
the evidence that he clkaims proves his innocence, and review of the actions of 
those who forced his plea knowing at the time he was not the killer. Macik 
deserves waiver of any procedural bars. access to the court. and justice. 
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
For the reasons as stated above, Mr. macik requests that this court overturn 
the decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals dismissing his petition and appeal. And 
requests that his convict ion be overturned, sentence revoked, and remanded for 
further proceedings and/or a new trial; 
In the alternative, and in the interest of justice, determine Mr. macik is 
innocent of the crime as charged and convicted, order time served, and order his 
release from incarceration. 
DATED This /1//z-day of UvrJCf , 2015. 
Petitioner Prose 
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CERTIFICATE OF SER.VICE 
I, Ronald Lee Macik , hereby certify that on This~day of 
p47ifl¢uvr'Y , 20i_S: I mailed a true and correct copy of: _______ _ 
BRIEF IN ~UPPORT OF PETITION FOR REVIEW 
to the parties listed below, by placing same in the Institutional Mail System, by 
handing it to the Institutional Paralegal Resource Center, privileged legal mail, 
for placement in the U.S. Mail. 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Cr1m1nal D1v1s1on 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
CERTIFICATE OF SER.VICE - 32 
RONALD LEE MACIK #12680 
Petitioner Prose 
